Why does Gordon England still cash a US Paycheck? and this isn't even what you think

The Future of the F-22 Raptor

U.S. Air Force (USAF) Gen. Bruce Carlson, commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, insisted Feb. 13 that the USAF will find a way -- one way or another -- to buy 380 fifth-generation F-22 Raptor stealth fighters. This is in direct contravention to the position of U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England, who contends that the current 183-airframe buy is sufficient, and that the line should start shutting down next year.

The F-22 is the replacement for the F-15 Eagle air superiority and attack aircraft designed in the late 60's and early seventies and built in the seventies.About 900 F-15's were built. It began in service in 1972.
Mr. England is not merely the dupe of people he foolishly trusted like Hesham Islam, but also the seminal former of dangerously stupid opinions.
Unless the the Air Force doesn't have enough money for food, it is absolutely DANGEROUSLY STUPID to imagine that 183 F-22 can replace the ~900 F-15A-D's the US needed.
It's hard to believe that 380 can do the job, let alone less than half that number.

Analysis

With a new U.S. administration headed for the White House in 2009, the Pentagon is having some internal battles over the future of a production line that is inching toward closure: the fifth-generation F-22 Raptor stealth fighter. U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England has argued in front of Congress to prevent an extension of the F-22 production run on his watch, while Commander of Air Force Materiel Command Gen. Bruce Carlson insisted Feb. 13 that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) will find a way to buy more than twice the number of F-22s currently slated for purchase.

Ultimately, this is maneuvering not just ahead of the inauguration of the 44th president but before a Congress looking to show that it is strong on defense -- and perfectly happy to allot additional funds related to the matter to members' states and districts. Nevertheless, it will be the next administration upon which the final decision about F-22 production will rest.

Americans who vote, are you getting this?

Politics aside, this is a choice about the future force structure of the USAF. The F-22 has been two decades in the making, and it promises to be the final word in air superiority throughout the next decade and beyond. Air superiority is, of course, one of the core longstanding missions of the USAF, and one that allows all other U.S. military operations to proceed supported and unimpeded.

But in making procurement decisions, the Pentagon is forced to look out beyond that horizon. The decision to buy the F-22 -- be it 180 airframes or 380 -- is in part a projection of force structure requirements in the 2025 time frame. However many F-22s the USAF determines it will need, it must make that decision now.

Once stopped, production is expensive to restart. There is no cheaper time to buy F-22 airframes than right now, when production is up and running at full capacity. Not only are research and development costs spread across more aircraft but production costs also can actually drop as manufacturers fine-tune techniques and gain experience with the design. (A single F-22 is running about $360 million, factoring in development costs; the production price itself has been steadily declining and is now pegged at around $140 million per aircraft.)

These F-22s will replace more than 500 (still flyable, not grounded) F-15A/B/C/D models -- some of which are showing serious signs of premature aging. The F-22 production run will be followed by a much more extensive F-35 Lightning II buy (formerly known as the Joint Strike Fighter program), currently anticipated to be on the order of 1,700 aircraft for the USAF alone. The F-35 has been conceived in part as a much more economical alternative to the F-22 (although the costs of the F-35 have been climbing at a disturbing rate and already have crept past $80 million per aircraft).

On one hand is the need to procure sufficient aircraft to absorb attrition (because of not only the age and wear-and-tear issues the USAF is accustomed to today but also the potential for significant combat losses in a future fight). On the other is the fact that the obsolescence of each F-22 and F-35 is installed with its ejection seat; while the constraints the human body's limitations put on combat aircraft are not new, the maturation of automated unmanned aerial systems has accelerated significantly in the last decade.

Thus, the Raptor and the Lightning II increasingly are likely to be the last two manned combat fighter jets in the inventory. The decision before the USAF, then, is not simply which wars likely will be fought in the next 30 years, but also how soon unmanned combat aerial systems will begin to eclipse the manned aircraft fleet.

Fine, so what are those budgets and plans? Are we betting the ranch on that?