Friday, March 08, 2013

John Galt’s Real Strike Chapter 5: THE US NAVY

As the needs of the US Navy are changing and the numbers of ever more expensive ships shrink to pre 1914 levels, one critical ship type the Navy decided it needed was the LCS, Littoral Combat Ship. Two designs were undertaken as as back as the late 80’s.

One design was a standard hull type. The Freedom:

The other was a Tri-Maran, the Independence:

Both ships are designed to get in close to land eliminate mines, and duke it out with shore based opposition.

Well … Fault Two… from Defense Industry Daily

Exploit simplicity, numbers, the pace of technology development in electronics and robotics, and fast reconfiguration. That was the US Navy’s idea for the low-end backbone of its future surface combatant fleet. Inspired by successful experiments like Denmark’s Standard Flex ships, the US Navy’s $35+ billion “Littoral Combat Ship” program was intended to create a new generation of affordable surface combatants that could operate in dangerous shallow and near-shore environments, while remaining affordable and capable throughout their lifetimes.

It hasn’t worked that way. In practice, what the Navy wanted, the capabilities needed to perform primary naval missions, and what could be delivered for the sums available, have proven nearly irreconcilable. The LCS program has changed its fundamental acquisition plan 4 times since 2005, and canceled contracts withbothcompeting teams during this period, without escaping any of its fundamental issues. This public-access FOCUS article offer a wealth of research material, alongside looks at the LCS program’s designs, industry teams procurement plans, military controversies, budgets and contracts.

So if that’s Fault 2 what’s Fault 1, you wonder?

It cannot survive in the environment it was designed for. It cannot locate mines because the helicopter and its towed mine-hunting sonar IS TOO HEAVY FOR THE SHIPS.

Who says so?

The US NAVY: