Wretchard questions the wisdom of the Serpent's Egg argument for entering into war:
A reader sends a video link to a Scott Ritter interview on Iranian uranium enrichment capability. Technically speaking Ritter is probably right in saying that Iran can't produce enough fissile material to make an A-bomb in the near future. For a collateral assessment see In From the Cold's: Numbers.
But for those who regard Iran as the Serpent's Egg there is no percentage waiting for it to progress any further. If the regime is inherently hostile in nature, then from that point of view a showdown as early as possible would be best.
Historically, the dangers on both sides of the Serpent's Egg argument can be illustrated by Germany. Germany probably started the First World War in the belief it was being strangled by France, England and Russia and 1914 was the year of "now or never".
But on the other hand, Munich is a counterexample of how it is genuinely possible to miss the "now or never" boat to preserve world peace.
Serpent's Egg arguments are dangerous ones indeed. The problem with history is that things are only clear in retrospect, but as a guide to the future, it is useful as driving down the freeway by looking only at the rear-view mirror.
I would like to ask our readers, who know history better than I, whether this comparison, between Germany circa 1914, and our current situation, is, at all, comparable.
Something tells me it isn't, IN THE LEAST,
I seriously doubt that, in the leadup to WWI, France had been advocating for the destruction of the German state for 27 years running.
Am I right, or what?
C'mon Wretchard, you can do better than that.
5 comments:
France had been ravanchist for the previous 43 years, every French politician was for regaining Alsace & Lorraine.
Germany had been threatening British seapower since 1890. Wilhelm had neglected to renew the nonaggression treaty with Russia (the 'Reinsurance Treaty'), so that Germany indeed felt surrounded.
But since Germany had no territorial claims in Europe, the only issue on the table was Alsace-Lorraine. In 1914, a rational assessment would have been that France was incapable of alone attacking Germany and that imbalance was only going to become worse.
In order to maintain a slightly smaller army (regulars plus reserves), France had to impress its young me for three years, while Germany was able to mass a larger army while using conscription for only 2 years.
Had Germany not worried about Russian opportunism in case of war elsewhere, she would have had no reason to fight over anything in Europe.
The problem was Conrad, the chief of staff of the Austrian army, who imagined (incorrectly) that he was a great captain and had appointed himself to settle the problem of Serbia for good.
Since Serbia was backed by Russia, Austria's military option against Serbia necessarily dragged in Germany. Britain and France would have stood aside, except that once the armies were mobilizing, they had to mobilize, too.
While mobilization was not the same as a declaration of war, in the overheated imaginations of the time, the distinction was lost.
So, yes, you are right, the situation in 1914 was irrelevant to anything going on in 2006.
On the other hand, after World War II was all over, Churchill wrote that there was a time when Hitler could have been stopped 'with the stroke of a pen.'
Although a large fraction of 'informed opinion' thought otherwise, it is now clear that acting against Germany at any time would have been cheaper than acting later. The costs only kept going up.
That is exactly relevant to Iran now.
On the third hand, action against the USSR would have been more costly, in American blood, at any time than 'containment' proved in the end to be. If you also count the lives of brown people, the calculation is more equivocal.
But that was because the USSR was a serious military power. Iran is not and never will be a serious military power.
Even with atomic bombs.
But it can do serious damage, with bombs, without being a military power.
The attitude of the violent wing if Islam is no different today, in any respect, than it was in 1897, when the Mahdi declared war against everybody.
But in 1897-8, the Mahdi was in Sudan, far from anything anybody cared about; and the reach of his most potent weapons was about 400 yards.
Had the Mahdi been able to do in London what he was doing in Khartoum, history no doubt would have been very different.
I have to agree with the above assessment- if we're going to make historical comparisons with Iran, surely the example of a pre-WW2 Germany is more apt.
Look at how appeasement worked out for us then.
Thanks, Harry and J-Mac.
My limited knowledge of history (I know WWII much better than WWI) brought me to the same conclusion as you.
I've been hearing this meme more often that history doesn't teach us lessons because no situation is exactly analagous. While that may be logically true, it does not seem to me to be rationally true.
The distinction I'm making is similar to the one we use in courts of law. We prove something to be true beyond a REASONABLE doubt, not beyond the shadow of a doubt.
A very similar question is being asked at volokh.com, and I posted a rather similar comment there. I added there, that History has very slender powers of compulsion.
She offers to teach. We have to choose to learn.
Harry,
You are a good writer. Would you care to become a contributor to IBA?
If so, leave me an email address, or email me at cuanasblog@yahoo.com.
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