From Atlas Shrugs
Op-Ed: Hagel’s $160 Billion 'West Bank
' US Troops Deathtrap, Mark Langfan,
February 23, 2013
Hagel, at Obama's bidding, plans to send troops to Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank") where they would soon be victims of Hamas terror. It's in writing. An investigative report.
There is only one reason that Chuck Hagel was picked by President Obama to be US Defense Secretary, and why Obama will go nuclear to get him confirmed:
Hagel is the only person alive now dumb enough to deploy US “peacekeeping” troops to what is surely a "West Bank" deathtrap. Don’t believe me??! Well, in early 2009, two years after Hamas violently took over Gaza, Hagel along with a ragged has-been crew of “Israel Lasters” had some strong “recommendations” for the incoming President Obama.
I will let Hagel’s 2009 “recommendations” speak for themselves. But to lend a note of rationality, Florence Gaub, a NATO researcher, in 2010 published a NATO Research paper outlining some of the problems of such a deployment. (I.e. it would need about 60,000 US/Nato troops and about 160 billion Dollars over 10 years) I and I will excerpt her report as well.
Obama’s determination in confirming Hagel is based on Obama’s belief that Hagel will cripple Israel at any price: including the deaths of thousands of US soldiers at the hands of Hamas suicide bombs in the Palestinian Authority.
“A Last Chance for a Two-State Israel-Palestine Agreement,” April 2009. “Submitted to the administration of President Barack Obama” by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chuck Hagel, et al.
The U.S. parameters should reflect the following fundamental compromise:
[A] non-militarized Palestinian state, together with security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting Palestinian sovereignty, and a U.S.-led multinational force to ensure a peaceful transitional security period. This coalition peacekeeping structure, under UN mandate, would feature American leadership of a NATO force supplemented by Jordanians, Egyptians and Israelis. We can envision a five-year, renewable mandate with the objective of achieving full Palestinian domination of security affairs on the Palestine side of the line within 15 years. Page 6
III. Substantive Issues to be Resolved: Israel-Palestine
The borders between the two states must be physically secure and fully controlled for their entire length. A U.S.-led multinational force would likely be essential for a transitional period once a peace agreement is concluded. Palestine would likely be non-militarized. No doubt Jerusalem will require a special security and administrative regime of its own and special arrangements will be needed for the use and regulation of Palestinian airspace. Page 12
Security. Demilitarization of the Golan Heights and limited forces zones on both sides – all likely to be supervised by multinational forces featuring American leadership – will be mandatory. Page 13
Annex: Addressing Israel’s Security Challenges
Beyond the current efforts we expect that, upon the full agreement of the parties, there will be a robust international effort involving outside armed forces for a period of indeterminate length assisting Palestinian authorities in executing their responsibilities in the security sphere and helping them build capacity in order eventually to act without outside assistance. Page 14
Naturally, the U.S. will play a large and perhaps decisive role. Yet it should not act alone – there should be broad participation reflecting international consensus on the importance of supporting the emergence of a truly sustainable two-state outcome. Page 14
Although General Jones’ mandate has focused exclusively on the Israel-Palestine track, clearly there would also be a robust American role in implementing the security-related aspects of any Israel-Syria accord. Beyond helping the IDF with improving capabilities designed to compensate for full withdrawal from territory occupied on the Syrian front since 1967, the U.S. would undoubtedly play a vital role in monitoring a demilitarized Golan Heights and providing early warning services to both parties. Page 16
In our view there is no avoiding a central U.S. role in helping the parties (especially the Palestinian side) meet their security-related responsibilities to each other in the context of two states. Page 16